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Abstract
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth allows for additional health care services
under restricted resources. We examine whether hospital policy can stimulate hos-
pital TFP growth. We exploit variation across German federal states in the period
1993 to 2013. State governments decide on hospital capacity planning (number of
hospitals, departments and beds), ownership, medical students, and hospital invest-
ment funding. We show that TFP growth in German hospital care reflects quality
improvements rather than increases in output volumes. Second-stage regression re-
sults indicate that reducing the length of stay is generally a proper way to foster
TFP growth. The effects of other hospital policies depend on the reimbursement
scheme: under activity-based (DRG) hospital funding, scope-related policies (pri-
vatization, specialization) come with TFP growth. Under fixed daily rate funding,
scale matters to TFP (hospital size, occupancy rates). Differences in capitalization
in East and West Germany allows to show that deepening capital may enhance TFP
growth if capital is scarce. We also show that there is less scope for hospital policies
after large-scale restructurings of the hospital sector.
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1. Introduction 
If health care outputs increase more than inputs, i.e., total factor productivity (TFP) grows, additional 
health services or shorter waiting times can be provided even under restricted resources (Bojke et al., 
2016). In this paper, we study the role of hospital policy in stimulating hospital TFP growth. Govern-
ments specialize, privatize, and enlarge hospitals, presuming to increase hospital productivity (Blank 
and Valdmanis, 2008; Productivity Commission, 2009; Carter, 2015). Little is known, however, whether 
these policies actually stimulate TFP. Previous studies focus on hospital funding only (Dismuke and 
Sena, 1999; Linna, 1999; Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2000; De Castro Lobo et al., 2010; Castelli et al., 
2015). As a sole exception, Blank and Eggink (2014) link time series in Dutch hospital productivity to 
different periods of hospital regulation and show that productivity was somewhat higher in times of 
stronger competition. 
Our setting is different. We exploit variation in hospital policies and hospital TFP growth across German 
federal states in the period 1993 to 2013. German state governments decide on hospital capacity plan-
ning, ownership, medical students, and hospital investment funding, while the central government is 
limited to setting the financial framework. We show that TFP growth in German hospital care reflects 
quality improvements rather than increases in output volumes. Second-stage regression results show 
that reducing the length of stay is generally a proper way to foster hospital TFP growth. The effects of 
other policies depend on the reimbursement scheme: under activity-based hospital funding, privatization 
and specialization come with TFP growth. Under fixed daily rate reimbursement, TFP growth accom-
panies increases in hospital size and in occupancy rates. Public investment funding and training medical 
students seem not to affect hospital TFP growth. We elaborate on East and West Germany separately. 
In West Germany, capital is scarce and substituting labor by capital enhances TFP growth. Non-findings 
for the entirely restructured and modernized hospital sector in East Germany after re-unification indicate 
that there is less scope for hospital policies after large-scale reforms. 
This study adds further aspects to the literature. First, we document substantial long run differences in 
regional hospital productivity growth and policy. Previous studies show regional variation in health care 
supply (e.g., Skinner, 2012, Kopetsch and Schmitz, 2014, Finkelstein et al., 2016), but only few cross-
sectional studies focus on regional differentials in the productivity of health services (Schleiniger, 2008; 
Bojke et al., 2013). We rely on a rich panel dataset covering German hospital development of about 20 
years. This allows us to exploit temporal differences in regional TFP growth rates. Second, our study 
bridges hospital-level TFP studies (seminally Färe et al., 1994a; for an overview see Hollingsworth, 
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2008)1 and studies using national accounts (Cromwell and Pope, 1989; Cylus and Dickensheets, 2008; 
Harper et al., 2010; Gu and Morin, 2014). Being the sole exceptions, de Nicola et al. (2013) and Aragon 
Aragon et al. (2015) examine productivity at the regional level. We exploit policy and productivity 
differences across regions; the 16 German federal states (Bundesländer) constitute our decision-making 
units of interest. Regional aggregation allows to use considerably more precise measures than at the 
hospital level (e.g., capital stocks).2 Aggregated data also internalize spatial correlations between hos-
pitals arising from patient transfers, geography and socio-demographic idiosyncrasies (Baltagi and Yen, 
2014) to large extent. We use two different TFP measures which allows us to decompose output growth 
into TFP and input growth contributions (Törnqvist index), and to further decompose TFP growth into 
efficiency and technological change (Malmquist index). Few general productivity studies (Färe et al., 
1994b; Kim and Park, 2006) and no health care-related study have applied both Törnqvist and 
Malmquist TFP. Third, only few hospital TFP studies use a second-stage regression to examine drivers 
of productivity (Dimas et al., 2012, Castelli et al., 2015). The panel structure of our dataset allows us to 
control for socio-demographic control variables, state fixed effects and time fixed effects in order to 
isolate sources of hospital TFP growth more precisely. 
2. Hospital policy in Germany 
In Germany, hospital policy is shared among the central government and the 16 state governments. The 
central government is limited to setting the financial framework, in particular, designing hospital reim-
bursement schemes for current expenditures. As the most important hospital reform among the last dec-
ades, the central government changed hospital reimbursement from fixed daily (per diem) rates to ac-
tivity-based financing (DRG) nationwide in 2004. State governments, by contrast, decide on hospital 
capacity plans, allocate funds on hospital investments, run university hospitals, and train medical stu-
dents (Wassener, 2002; Bremner, 2011; Ettelt et al., 2012; Mätzke, 2013). German state governments 
thus “play an active part in day-to-day health policy” (Wassener, 2002, p. 99).  
We identify six different policies of state governments which may have an effect on hospital productivity 
(see Figure 1). First, ownership may matter to productivity. Privatization of hospitals is mentioned as a 
                                                     
1 Recent hospital TFP studies are, e.g., Barros et al. (2008), Gannon (2008), de Castro Lobo et al. (2010), Ng 
(2011), Dimas et al. (2012), and Castelli et al. (2015). For further studies and a synopsis see Table S.1 in the 
supplementary material. 
2 In the context of productivity studies, aggregation should be carried out with caution. Aggregation may not only 
lead to a substantial loss in variation but also to ecological fallacies. In this study, however, state-level aggregates 
perfectly coincide with our decision-making units of main interest (state governments). 
4 
strategy to induce efficiency, even though evidence is mixed (Tiemann et al., 2012). We use the state-
level share of private for-profit hospitals to measure privatization,3 yielding a spread from 0% (Saarland) 
to 70% (Hamburg) in 2013 (Figure 1 a), left-hand side). By contrast, the share of public hospitals de-
creases for decades (Figure 1 a), right-hand side). The hospitals remaining are private non-profit. 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
Second, German state governments determine the number of hospitals, beds, and departments (hospital 
capacity planning). Some hospital plans even include the precise number of beds of all departments and 
all hospitals (either public, private for-profit, or private non-profit) within the state. Enlarging or stipu-
lating hospital mergers may induce scale effects that in turn enhance productivity (Bazzoli, 2008; em-
pirical evidence is mixed, see Gaynor et al., 2012). The average hospital size varies substantially across 
the states, ranging from 170 beds per hospital (Schleswig-Holstein) to 370 beds per hospital (Thuringia) 
in 2013 (see Figure 1 b)).  
Third, hospital capacity plans also describe the specialization of hospitals. Specialization may stimulate 
TFP if gains from expertise outweigh the economies of scope from joint production (Castelli et al., 
2015). We use the normalized Gini index of hospital beds in 18 hospital departments (state aggregates) 
(Figure 1 c)). The larger this index, the more the state hospital sector is specialized in a certain discipline, 
e.g., heart disease. Specialization decreases between 1993 and 2013 and, again, varies across states. 
Fourth, German state governments allocate funds on hospital investment (Pilny, 2016). New technolo-
gies, financed by state investment funding, may increase hospital TFP growth. Figure 1 d) however 
shows that the state budget share for hospital investment funding decreases in all states between 1993 
and 2013. 
Fifth, German states determine the number of medical students in universities (Figure 1 e)). Training 
medical students consumes resources and may hamper TFP at least in the short run (Grosskopf et al., 
2001; Castelli et al., 2015). 
Sixth, shortening the average length of stay, increasing the occupation rate, and deepening capital are 
often mentioned as productivity enhancing strategies, but are mainly the responsibility of hospital man-
agers. The left-hand and center graph of Figure 1 f) show that the average length of stay converges 
                                                     
3 The number of small, medium and large private for-profit hospitals grew to the same extent as the number of 
beds in each subgroup. The number of hospitals thus captures the trend towards privatization well. 
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whereas occupation rates seems to diverge in Germany. Health policy can induce some pressure. The 
occupation rate depends on the number and spatial distribution of hospital beds which is a result of 
capacity planning. The length of stay is a key element in many hospital plans, e.g., in the state of Hesse 
(Section 17 of the Hessian hospital act). Though less visible, state politicians also exert informal pres-
sure on hospitals. The mix of capital and labor is also mainly determined by hospital managers but 
depends on the legal and financial framework (e.g., construction and hygiene standards). Deepening 
capital has been shown to increase hospital TFP to some extent (Gu and Morin, 2014). Figure 1 f) (right-
hand side) shows the capital intensity in three groups of German states. The sharp increase in capital 
intensity in the five East German states is a result of massive investments after the re-unification. Capital 
intensity increases steadily in the ten West German states. As an outlier, the once over-sized hospital 
sector in the formerly divided city of Berlin convergences toward the German average.4 
Altogether, German states vary substantially in different aspects of hospital policy. In the remaining part 
of the paper, we study whether these differences translate into differences in hospital TFP growth. We 
also examine the party affiliation of the health minister. Left-wing parties favor equality and redistribu-
tion rather than competition, and run a larger public sector than their right-wing counterparts.5 Left-wing 
health ministers may thus impose less pressure on hospitals than their right-wing colleagues. Previous 
studies show that spatial distribution of hospital beds is more equally distributed across German states 
that are governed by a left-wing party (Bennema-Broos et al., 2001). We hypothesize that incentives to 
enhance productivity are lower under left-wing state health ministers. 
3. Methods 
We follow a two-stage strategy. In the first stage, we calculate the annual productivity change of the 
state hospital sector. We adopt the Malmquist and the Törnqvist indices. In the second stage, we use a 
fixed effects panel regression to reveal policies that coincide with productivity gains. We use state-level 
aggregates throughout the entire analysis. 
3.1 Total factor productivity (TFP) 
Total factor productivity change (TFP) refers to changes in outputs that cannot be attributed to shifts in 
inputs. We use two deterministic concepts in measuring TFP, representing a frontier (Malmquist index) 
                                                     
4 The division of Berlin induced a massive oversupply in hospital care because both the GDR and the Federal 
Republic of Germany run a full-sized hospital sector for each part of the city. 
5 Vatter and Rüefli (2003) and Herwatz and Theilen (2014) show higher health expenditures under left-wing gov-
ernments. Potrafke (2010) however do not reveal significant partisan differences in health care expenditures. 
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and a non-frontier approach (Törnqvist index).6 The Törnqvist index allows to decompose output growth 
into TFP and input growth contributions. The Malmquist index, by contrast, allows to decompose TFP 
growth into efficiency and technological change. Multiple decision-making units can be benchmarked 
by the index concept described by Malmquist (1953) (see Caves et al., 1982; Färe et al., 1994b). The 
(output-oriented) Malmquist index in period 𝑡 is the ratio of two distance functions measuring the max-
imal proportional change of the input-output combination of the previous period (𝑥𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡−1) (denomi-
nator) and of the current period (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) (numerator), holding the production technology of a certain 
point of time constant. Malmquist TFP, 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡
𝑀𝑄
, is the geometric mean of two Malmquist indices for 
the production technology in period 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡:7 
 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡
𝑀𝑄
= ln 𝑀𝑄𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡−1) = ln [(
𝐷𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
𝐷𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡−1,𝑦𝑡−1)
) (
𝐷𝑡(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)
𝐷𝑡(𝑥𝑡−1,𝑦𝑡−1)
)]
1
2
  (1) 
We use the data envelopment analysis (DEA) to compute Malmquist productivity indices. This allows 
to decompose 𝑀𝑄𝑡 into changes in efficiency (EFFCH) and into a frontier effect (TECHCH). The non-
frontier index concept of Törnqvist (1936) can be derived as a special case of the Malmquist index (Färe 
et al., 1994b) and is roughly equivalent to the growth accounting framework of Solow (1957). We as-
sume a Cobb-Douglas production function and compute the Törnqvist TFP by logarithmic transfor-
mation. The Törnqvist TFP can be written as the difference of (logarithmic computed) output growth 
rates and cost share-weighted8 input growth rates: 
 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡
𝑇𝑄 = ln (
𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡−1
) − ∑ 𝛼𝑛,𝑡 ln (
𝑥𝑛,𝑡
𝑥𝑛,𝑡−1
)𝑁𝑛=1  (2) 
3.2 Inputs and outputs 
Output. Studies on hospital TFP vary substantially in outputs and inputs (for a synopsis, see Table S.1 
in the supplementary material).9 We run separate TFP calculations for three different output measures: 
                                                     
6 Econometric and thus non-deterministic approaches such as the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) control for 
random shocks but rely on a large set of econometric assumptions (Del Gatto et al., 2011). Because we investigate 
data at the state level, idiosyncratic shocks to productivity at the hospital level are internalized to large extent, and 
econometric methods are not adequate for our study design. 
7 Färe et al. (1994b) propose to subtract 1 from 𝑀𝑄 to compute TFP. However, for small TFP (in absolute terms), 
both methods yield almost identical results. Using logarithmic transformation is more similar to the Törnqvist 
index. 
8 The weights 𝛼𝑛,𝑡 in period 𝑡 are given by the costs of input 𝑛 in relation to total costs. As common in productivity 
analysis, we calculate weights as the mean of the current period 𝑡 and the previous period 𝑡 − 1. 
9 For a more general discussion on measuring health care inputs and outputs, see Newhouse (1994), Bloor and 
Maynard (2006), Castelli et al. (2007), Hollingsworth (2008). 
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the number of discharges, a quality index, and the quality-adjusted number of discharges (outcome).10 
First, we use the annual number of in-patient discharges according to the strict separation of the in-
patient hospital sector and the out-patient health care sector in Germany. The length of stay, in contrast, 
will be used here as an explanatory variable only in the second-stage regression.11 Second, we construct 
a quality index which reflects mortality. According to Varabyova and Schreyögg (2013), successful 
treatments and quality improvements in hospital care materialize in decreases in hospital mortality. Our 
quality index increases from 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1 as the difference in growth rates of the in-patient mortality rate 
and the overall population mortality rate decreases. Subtracting overall population mortality accounts 
for health improvements that lie beyond hospital care (e.g., higher level of fitness, fewer smokers).12 We 
use in-hospital mortality rates because the 30-days mortality rate as the preferable measure is not avail-
able. Data aggregation at the state level however absorbs idiosyncratic local events and re-admissions 
to a large extent. Third, we define hospital outcome (quality-adjusted discharges) as the product of the 
number of discharges and the mortality-based quality index. 
Labor. We observe full-time equivalents of three types of labor input: physicians, nurses and other staff. 
The labor cost share is the ratio of total wages and total costs. Törnqvist labor growth is the sum of 
growth rates of each labor type, weighted by the two-year average wage share of each labor type (see 
Cromwell and Pope, 1989; O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009). 
Capital. Fast-moving medical progress leads to an enormous increase in capital quality that is not cap-
tured by the number of hospital beds. We use self-compiled capital stocks for the hospital sector of all 
16 states that reflect both capital quantity and quality. Our long-term investment series (1950–2013) for 
each of the 16 states base on a large set of data sources (see Section 4 and Table S.3 in the supplementary 
material).13 We apply the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) (Schmalwasser and Schidlowski, 2006; 
OECD, 2009) and calculate capital stocks in constant prices as the sum of non-retired investments of 
                                                     
10 For reasons of simplicity, we derive the quality index based TFP as the difference of outcome based TFP and 
output volume based TFP. 
11 We treat the length of stay as a main characteristic of a discharge but not as an output itself. Using the length of 
stay as an additional output does not allow to calculate TFP rates based on the Törnqvist index because explicit 
index weights of discharges and the length of stay are not derivable. Results of the second-stage regression how-
ever do not change to large extent when we use the length of stay as an additional output in the Malmquist frame-
work and exclude the length of stay from the second-stage regression. For details, see the supplementary material 
(Table S.6). 
12 For example, if the in-hospital mortality rate decrease by 10% and the overall population mortality rate decrease 
by 7%, the hospital-related decrease in hospital mortality amounts to 10% – 7% = 3%. The quality index increases 
from 100.0 to (100.0 × 1.03) = 103.0. 
13 In Germany, no data on capital or investments of the hospital sector are collected, even at the national level. 
8 
prior periods. Further details are provided in the supplementary material. We compute the cost share of 
capital as the share of our estimated depreciation and interest payments. 
Intermediate goods. Intermediate hospital goods such as food, medical goods, water, power or fuel sup-
plies are essential to hospital production. We follow the KLEMS approach (O’Mahony and Timmer, 
2009) and use separate series for energy (including water supply and the like), materials and service 
expenses in constant prices. We deflate energy expenses using the state-level consumer price index for 
energy and fuel.14 Material expenses are deflated by the GDP price index, and services are deflated by 
the GDP-based price index for services. Cost shares for each type of intermediate goods are given by 
their two-year average cost shares. 
3.3 Second-stage regression 
We use the TFP growth rates derived in the first step as the dependent variable in a second-stage regres-
sion. We include time and state fixed effects. State fixed effects cover unobservable heterogeneity across 
German states (i.e., attitudes toward health and social care). Time effects eliminate effects of national 
reforms that affect all states simultaneously. We use growth rates of all variables to ensure stationarity, 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors as proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980), and mean 
1993–2013 state population as regression weights.15 Our OLS model takes the following form: 
 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑍𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
where 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represents the annual productivity change of state 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡 define state and 
year fixed effects. 𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝑃 is a vector of the hospital policies shown in Figure 1; all 
variables are included in growth rates: the share of public hospitals and the share of private for-profit 
hospitals (private non-profit hospitals being the base category), the average hospital size in a federal 
state, a specialization measure (Gini index of beds in 18 state-aggregated hospital departments), the state 
budget share of hospital funding, and the number of students of human medicine. We also include a 
dummy for left-wing health ministers.16 Finally, vector 𝑃 includes hospital policy induced measures. 
These are the length of stay, the occupancy, and capital intensity (ratio of capital stock and total staff). 
                                                     
14 If price indices for energy are not available at the state level, we instead apply the national counterpart. However, 
state-level and national price indices for energy only differ to small extent in Germany. 
15 Weighting accounts for substantial differences in state population. Inferences basically do not change when we 
use unweighted regressions. 
16 The dummy for left-wing health ministers equals one if the minister is affiliated with one of the left-wing parties 
SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen or Die Linke, and zero otherwise. 
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We include a large set of further socio-demographic and political economy control variables, 𝑍. These 
are the case mix index (Grosskopf et al., 1993), which we proxy by the share of intensive care days,17 
patient flows between the states, and socio-demographic issues that may drive regional hospital demand 
(old-age dependency ratio, unemployment rate, GDP per capita). We also include the ratio of out-patient 
and in-patient physicians to capture substitutional (or complementary) effects between the hospital and 
the out-patient sector. 
4. Data 
Our dataset includes state-level aggregates of all variables for the period 1993 to 2013 for the 16 federal 
states (Bundesländer) of Germany. Data on output, and labor and intermediate inputs are obtained from 
the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. Main data sources for our self-compiled capital stocks are 
publications of the German hospital association on investment funding of general and specialized hos-
pitals, and publications of the Federal Statistical Office documenting university hospitals’ investments. 
We merge this data with a large number of studies on investments financed by hospitals’ own funds, 
historical capital stocks and data on hospital funding in the former East German GDR.18 
Figure 2 gives an impression of our dataset (Table S.2 in the supplementary material provides further 
descriptive statistics). The left-hand figure shows the evolution of the number of discharges, quality 
index, and outcome (quality-adjusted discharges) as well as the evolution of input volumes. Output vol-
ume, quality index, and outcome increase each year, the years 2004 to 2008 being the exception. The 
output volume roughly parallels the quality index. Growth rates of discharges and quality index of indi-
vidual states are correlated by 0.59 between 1993 and 2013. Capital and intermediates follow the out-
come trend. Labor virtually stagnates between 1993 and 2013. The cost shares of the three input types 
are shown in the right-hand part of Figure 2. All cost shares remain almost constant over the entire 
period of 20 years which corroborates findings for the US (Cylus and Dickensheets, 2008). 
 [Figure 2 about here] 
                                                     
17 Data on the case mix index are not available for the period before 2004. However, the state-level case mix index 
and the share of intensive care days follow the same trend between 2005 and 2013. The correlation amounts to 
𝑟 = 0.25 and is significant at the 1% level. We also replaced the intensive care days by case mix index for the 
period from 2005 to 2013 as a robustness test. Inferences do not change (see Figure S.5 in the supplementary 
material). 
18 Table S.3 the supplementary material provides more details. 
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5. Results 
5.1 TFP growth 
Table I shows the mean growth rates of hospital TFP based on the number of discharges, on the quality 
index, and on outcome serving as output measure each (panel A). For sensitivity analyses, we also re-
place our input measures by conventionally used measures such as total staff, hospital beds, and total 
intermediates (panel B).19 
 [Table I about here] 
We focus on outcome based productivity which reflects output quantity and quality and derive three 
main results. First, hospitals realize a substantial increase in outcome related TFP of 0.48% (Malmquist, 
column (5), third row) to 1.30% (Törnqvist, column (4)). The difference between Malmquist and 
Törnqvist TFP is mainly driven by the factor capital in East Germany. The exceptionally large growth 
rates in East German capital stocks in the 1990s shift the Malmquist index of East Germany and overall 
Germany downwards. In West Germany, Malmquist TFP (1.11%) equals Törnqvist TFP (1.09%) (for 
details see Table S.4 in the supplementary material). Given that the Törnqvist index is more reliable 
than the Malmquist index, TFP growth can be seen as the by far most important contribution to hospital 
outcome growth in Germany. Total input growth contributes 1.13% to outcome growth (sum of col-
umns (1) to (3)). Figure 3 shows that TFP growth rates vary over time. Growth rates decrease monoton-
ically until 2004. Since 2004, TFP growth re-increases. This turnaround corresponds with the introduc-
tion of the German Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) system in 2004. We will discuss differences in 
subperiods in more detail later on. 
 [Figure 3 about here] 
Second, gains in hospital TFP entirely stem from improvements in quality, which is in line with the 
results of Arocena and García-Prado (2007). Productivity growth in quality is larger than 0.8% per year 
in all specifications (see columns (4) and (5)). Output-input ratios of the number of discharges, by con-
trast, stagnate over time (-0.05%, see column (4)). Thus, TFP growth in German hospital care stems 
from quality improvements rather than from increases in output volumes. 
                                                     
19 Only few studies have systematically compared the impact of different input-output specifications (e.g., Crom-
well and Pope, 1989; Valdmanis, 1992). 
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Third, hospital TFP growth is a result of technological progress rather than efficiency induced. Techno-
logical progress (TECHCH, the shift of the frontier) contributes 0.32% to outcome based Malmquist 
TFP (column (7)); efficiency (EFFCH) contributes 0.16%. Thus, movements toward the technological 
frontier seem to play only a minor role for hospital TFP. Figure 3 underpins this finding. The evolution 
of Malmquist TECHCH (lower graphics, right-hand side) parallels the trend of TFP growth. By contrast, 
Malmquist EFFCH varies little over time and does not parallel TFP. We observe a similar evolution of 
the Törnqvist and the Malmquist index which are correlated by 0.80 for the entire period and all states.20 
This indicates that the neoclassical assumptions of the Törnqvist index seem to hold in the case of the 
German hospital sector, despite the very high level of state regulation. 
At a first glance, hospital TFP in Germany seems to be a result of technologically induced improvements 
in quality. However, below we examine the sources of TFP growth in a second-stage regression in more 
detail and show below that also health care policies by state governments play an important role. 
5.2 Effects of hospital policies 
We link TFP growth rates to hospital policy in a second-stage regression. Table II shows our baseline 
results. Törnqvist TFP, Malmquist TFP, EFFCH and TECHCH are the dependent variables each. Due 
to their high correlations, all TFP measures yield similar results in many cases. Again, we mainly refer 
to outcome based productivity results (columns (9) to (12)). 
 [Table II about here] 
We find significant effects of specialization and hospital size on Törnqvist TFP rates and on Malmquist 
subindices. Enlarging hospital size is positively and significantly correlated with the catch-up effect 
(EFFCH) in terms of quality (column (7) and (11)). At the same time, larger hospitals are also associated 
with less technological progress (TECHCH), see columns (4) and (12). This finding follows the con-
ventional economic intuition of a trade-off between scale effects but less innovation when enlarging 
production. Both effects cancel out in the case of the Malmquist TFP corroborating micro-level evidence 
(e.g., Gaynor et al., 2012). Productivity gains also accompany specialization. This is in line with eco-
nomic intuition: Focusing on certain disciplines allows to produce to a higher quality and quantity. This 
effect is significant for the Törnqvist TFP (columns (1), (5), and (9)), and Malmquist EFFCH (columns 
(3) and (11)). Again, however, both effects cancel out for Malmquist TFP. 
                                                     
20 In West Germany, the correlation amounts to 0.89. 
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Coefficients for other policy measures such as ownership, hospital funding, or training medical students 
do only occasionally turn out to be significant, but do not seem to have a systematic impact. The same 
holds true for our socio-economic control variables. Given that Törnqvist TFP is less biased by the large 
capital growth rates in East Germany in the 1990s and therefore more reliable than Malmquist TFP, our 
results indicate that hospital size and specialization are the main policy forces of hospital TFP growth. 
Governments can influence these variables directly via hospital capacity planning. 
In almost all specifications, we also find a substantial and significant correlation between policy induced 
measures and productivity. In terms of outcome, a decrease of 1% in the average length of stay is asso-
ciated with an increase of 0.9–1.2% in hospital productivity (columns (9) and (10)) which is in line with 
recent studies (Ashby et al., 2000; Dimas et al., 2012; Castelli et al., 2015). The occupancy rate also 
turns out to be significant in several specifications, especially in the case of the number of discharges 
and outcome based productivity. Increasing hospital occupancy by 1% comes with an increase in 
productivity of about 0.3% (column (9) and (10)). We do not find effects of the capital intensity for the 
overall sample. 
5.3 Large-scale reorganizations 
The re-unification of Germany in 1990 allows us to examine the effects of hospital policies after large-
scale reorganizations. After re-unification, the East German hospital sector was drastically reshaped and 
downscaled. Also enormous investments were made to modernize the outworn capital stock. East Ger-
man state governments were able to design and to implement an efficiently scaled hospital sector over-
night, which is in stark contrast to the more evolutionary slow-moving reforms in West Germany. 
We elaborate on West and East Germany separately. The results in Table III show that the length of stay 
and the occupancy rate matter to outcome based TFP growth in both regions.21 By contrast, we do not 
find any robust correlation of hospital policies and hospital TFP growth in East Germany.22 The consol-
idation of the East German hospital sector in 1990 included closures and reorganizations of departments 
among all hospitals according to future needs. We conclude that gains from further reforms are low in 
the aftermath of large-scale hospital sector reorganizations. 
                                                     
21 Results for discharges based and quality index based TFP are provided in the supplementary material. See Tables 
S.7 to S.10. 
22 Hospital size is the sole exception: An increase in East German hospital size comes with decreases in TFP. 
Interestingly, in West Germany, hospital size is positively correlated with TFP growth. Given that East German 
hospitals (323 beds on average) are substantially larger than West German hospitals (264 beds), we conclude that 
the turning point in the relation of hospital size and hospital TFP growth is between 260 to 320 beds per hospital. 
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In West Germany, by contrast, significant correlations of TFP growth and almost all policy variables 
imply that further health care reforms might be valuable source of productivity growth. However, polit-
ical barriers may hinder consolidations. Productivity growth in West German hospitals is significantly 
lower under left-wing health ministers. Favoring a larger public sector, left-wing health ministers may 
impose less pressure on hospitals than right-wing health ministers. In East Germany, partisanship does 
not play a role which is consistent with the fact that the hospital sector is consolidated and there is less 
ideological conflict (Potrafke, 2013). We also find that increases in capital intensity comes with in-
creases in hospital TFP in West Germany, where a general shortage in hospital capital is reported. In the 
modernized East German hospital sector, by contrast, increases in capital intensity do not stimulate TFP 
growth anymore. Thus, deepening capital may enhance hospital productivity as long as the hospital 
sector suffers from a shortage in capital.  
5.4 Reimbursement schemes 
We also exploit the nationwide change in hospital reimbursement from fixed daily (per diem) rates to 
activity-based financing (DRG) in 2004.23 We interact all variables with a dummy variable for the DRG 
period (2004 to 2013) to study whether effects depend on different reimbursement schemes. In Table IV, 
we present the effects of hospital policies for the period of fixed daily (per diem) rates and for DRG 
reimbursement separately. In columns (9) to (12), we test whether differences between both periods are 
statistically different from zero. Corroborating all findings so far, the average length of stay is strongly 
negatively associated with TFP growth before and after 2004. Introducing DRG, however, almost tripled 
the coefficient; the difference of about 0.9 to 1.0 is significantly different from zero, at least at the 5% 
level (columns (9) and (10)). Under activity-based hospital financing, incentives to reduce the length of 
stay are much higher than under a fixed daily base rate (O’Reilly et al., 2012). 
The effect of other policies, by contrast, depend on the reimbursement scheme. Under fixed daily rates, 
increases in occupancy rates and hospital size are significantly correlated with TFP growth (see columns 
(1) to (3)). Larger and highly utilized hospitals allow for more treatment days which is in line with 
financial incentives from fixed daily reimbursement. By contrast, coefficients of specialization, privati-
zation, and other policy measures do not turn out to be significant. This finding inverts under DRG 
funding: the occupancy rate and hospital size do not have a systematic effect on TFP growth (col-
umns (5) to (8)). Instead, we find that DRG funding induces incentives to focus on discharges rather 
                                                     
23 In 2003, hospitals can opt for DRG-based financing on a voluntary basis. Since 01.01.2004, DRG-based financ-
ing is mandatory for general hospitals in Germany. 
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than on treatment days in a profit maximization context. An increase of the share of private hospitals of 
1% is associated with a significant increase in hospital productivity of 0.06%. Also specialization comes 
with gains in productivity (column (5) and (7)). Specialization leads to expertise which in turn materi-
alizes in a greater quantity and quality of discharges using a given input mix. Patient mobility provides 
further evidence for this channel. Under DRG funding, a larger share of patients moving to another state 
to receive hospitals treatments is significantly correlated with increases in TFP growth (see columns (5) 
and (6)). This indicates that the selection of patients into state hospital sectors according to the different 
specialization has increased. If specialized treatments are not provided by nearby hospitals in a certain 
state, patients might be better off to move to another state. DRG-induced reductions of the length of stay 
may also have deepened the links to the out-patient sector. We find a positive and significant correlation 
of TFP growth and the share of out-patient by in-patient physicians for the DRG period only (columns 
(5) and (6)). To sum up, the effects of hospital policies on productivity growth highly depend on the 
reimbursement scheme: Scale-related policies (hospital size, occupancy rates) matter under fixed daily 
rates funding; scope (specialization, privatization) drives TFP growth under DRG funding. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study policy determinants of hospital productivity growth in Germany. We find that 
quality improvements rather than increases in quantity volumes generate TFP growth in hospital care. 
In any case, reducing the length of stay is a proper way to enhance hospital TFP. The effects of other 
hospital policies depend on the reimbursement scheme: scope-related policies (privatization, specializa-
tion) come with TFP growth under activity-based hospital funding. Under fixed daily rate reimburse-
ment, scale (hospital size, occupancy rates) matters to TFP growth. These results imply that hospital 
reform measures should always be in line with reimbursement incentives. The case of East Germany 
also shows that large-scale reforms can be a perfect equivalent for incremental changes. After drastic 
consolidations of the hospital sector, there is less scope for further effects of hospital policy. 
Our study derives insights from the frontier Malmquist approach and from the non-frontier Törnqvist 
approach. We also show that TFP calculations are more sensitive to different measures of inputs and 
outputs rather than to different index concepts. Malmquist and the Törnqvist TFP are correlated by 0.80 
for the entire period and for all states. We conclude that the strictly neoclassical assumptions of the 
Törnqvist index hold despite the very high level of state regulation of the hospital sector. By contrast, 
using hospital beds as capital input may bias productivity rates upwards because the number of beds 
does not reflect capital quality. 
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Limitations of this study may encourage further research. First, our input measures capture quality as 
best as possible whereas output quality was proxied by in-hospital mortality. Further studies on hospital 
TFP may elaborate on more precise output measures. Second, studies on hospital TFP should use more 
precise measures and test different methods in measuring TFP for robustness exercises. The well-devel-
oped survey of Del Gatto et al., (2011) outlines a global picture of TFP methodology that has not been 
systematically discussed with respect to health care issues. 
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FIGURE 1. STATE VARIATION IN GERMAN HOSPITAL POLICY 
 a) Ownership b) Hospital size 
 
 c) Specialization d) Hospital funding e) Students of medicine 
  
  f) Hospital policy induced 
  
Notes: Figures show different hospital policies or policy induced strategies of the 16 German states for the period from 1993 to 2013. Gray lines show individual states, the dark 
bold line represents the state average. 
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FIGURE 2. OUTPUTS AND INPUTS, TÖRNQVIST COST SHARES 
 
Notes: The figures shows the evolution of hospital output and inputs (national aggregates) in Germany, 1993–
2013, and the evolution of the Törnqvist cost shares, which add up to one. 
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FIGURE 3. HOSPITAL TFP GROWTH IN GERMANY, 1993–2013 
  
    
Notes: The figure depicts the evolution Törnqvist and Malmquist hospital TFP growth, 1993–2013. Gray lines 
show individual states, the dark bold line represents the state average. 
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TABLE I. PRODUCTIVITY RESULTS, 1993–2013 
Output variable 
Törnqvist Malmquist 
Input growth contributionsa 
TFP TFP 
Thereof: 
Labor Capital 
Intermediate 
goods 
EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Baseline (Labor: 3 types of staff, Capital: Capital stocks, Intermediates: 3 types of intermediates) 
Number of discharges 0.01% 0.34% 0.78% -0.05% -0.37% 0.30% -0.67% 
Quality index 0.01% 0.34% 0.78% 1.35% 0.85% -0.14% 0.99% 
Outcome 0.01% 0.34% 0.78% 1.30% 0.48% 0.16% 0.32% 
Panel B: Sensitivity test (Labor: total staff, Capital: beds, Intermediates: total intermediates) 
Number of discharges -0.18% -0.12% 0.80% 0.59% 1.01% 0.32% 0.69% 
Quality index -0.18% -0.12% 0.80% 1.35% 1.34% -0.26% 1.60% 
Outcome -0.18% -0.12% 0.80% 1.94% 2.35% 0.06% 2.29% 
Notes: The table depicts the results of our TFP calculations. a) The sum of the growth contributions of all inputs 
and TFP is identical to the output growth rate. 
  
TABLE II. SECOND-STAGE REGRESSION, 1993–2013 
 Number of discharges Quality index Outcome (quality-adjusted discharges) 
 
Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist 
TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Policy             
Δln Share of public hospitals -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001 
Δln Share of private for-profit hospitals 0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.000 0.006 0.005 0.016 -0.011 0.008 -0.003 0.008 -0.011 
Δln Hospital size 0.071* -0.015 0.050 -0.065* 0.073 0.078 0.129*** -0.050 0.144** 0.063 0.178*** -0.115** 
Δln Specialization  0.228** 0.100 0.260*** -0.160 0.224* -0.039 0.229 -0.268** 0.452** 0.062 0.489** -0.427** 
Δln Share of hospital funding 0.006 0.007 0.014** -0.007 -0.009 -0.004 -0.013* 0.009* -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Δln Students of human medicine 0.012 0.015 0.041 -0.026 0.021 0.004 0.011 -0.007 0.033 0.019 0.052 -0.033 
Left-wing health minister  0.001 0.004 0.004* -0.000 -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.009** -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 
Hospital policy induced             
Δln Length of stay  -0.400*** -0.607*** -0.541*** -0.067 -0.488*** -0.571*** -0.236 -0.335** -0.888*** -1.179*** -0.777*** -0.402** 
Δln Occupancy rate 0.176*** 0.143 0.177*** -0.034 0.160 0.168 0.140 0.028 0.336** 0.311* 0.317** -0.006 
Δln Capital intensity 0.018 0.032 0.011 0.021 -0.035 -0.219*** -0.081* -0.138*** -0.017 -0.187** -0.070 -0.117* 
Socio-economic conditions             
Δln Share of intensive care days -0.057 -0.033 0.003 -0.036* -0.062 -0.073 -0.025 -0.048 -0.119* -0.107 -0.022 -0.084* 
Δln Share of in-commut. patients from other s. -0.000 0.006 0.010 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.021 -0.019 -0.002 0.007 0.031 -0.023 
Δln Share of out-commut. patients to other s. -0.008 0.008 -0.013 0.021 0.028 0.042 -0.001 0.043 0.020 0.050 -0.014 0.064** 
Δln Out-patient physician per in-patient phys. 0.051** 0.112*** 0.009 0.103* 0.061 0.076 -0.078 0.154* 0.112 0.188** -0.069 0.257** 
Δln Old-age dependency ratio 0.381* 0.209 0.434* -0.226 0.248* 0.236 -0.136 0.372** 0.629* 0.445 0.298 0.147 
Δln Unemployment rate -0.028 -0.026 -0.019 -0.007 0.009 0.013 0.053 -0.040 -0.019 -0.013 0.034 -0.046 
Δln GDP per capita -0.169** -0.267** -0.106 -0.162 0.057 0.146 0.014 0.132 -0.112 -0.121 -0.092 -0.029 
Constant -0.002 -0.024* -0.020** -0.004 0.022** 0.021 -0.004 0.025*** 0.020 -0.003 -0.024 0.021 
Obs. 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.602 0.480 0.336 0.582 0.600 0.530 0.465 0.736 0.637 0.580 0.534 0.749 
Notes: The table shows the results of second-stage regressions using output, quality and outcome based TFP calculations as the dependent variable (columns (1)–(4): output, 
columns (5)–(8): quality, columns (9)–(12): outcome). The unit of observation are the 16 German states. All variables in growth rates (with exceptions of the dummy variables). 
Average state population 1993–2013 serves as regression weight. Significance levels (robust standard errors): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
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TABLE III. WEST GERMANY AND EAST GERMANY, 1993–2013 
 Outcome (quality-adjusted discharges) 
 West Germanya East Germanyb 
 
Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist 
TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Policy         
Δln Share of public hospitals 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.033 0.011 -0.002 0.013 
Δln Share of private for-profit hospitals 0.026 0.010 0.011 -0.001 0.016 -0.006 0.010 -0.016 
Δln Hospital size 0.200** 0.117 0.205** -0.087 0.051 -0.216** -0.019 -0.197** 
Δln Specialization  0.782*** 0.534** 0.970*** -0.436 0.003 -0.982 -0.070 -0.911 
Δln Share of hospital funding 0.003 0.012 0.007 0.005 -0.019* -0.029 -0.012 -0.018 
Δln Students of human medicine 0.051 0.082 0.128 -0.046 0.227 0.127 0.137 -0.010 
Left-wing health minister  -0.011** -0.011* -0.010** -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 
Hospital policy induced         
Δln Length of stay  -0.721** -1.054*** -0.726*** -0.328* -1.355** -1.215 -0.803* -0.411 
Δln Occupancy rate 0.339* 0.351 0.366* -0.015 0.549** 0.674* 0.330 0.345** 
Δln Capital intensity 0.263** 0.187* 0.157 0.030 -0.018 -0.246 -0.240* -0.005 
Socio-economic conditions         
Δln Share of intensive care days -0.201* -0.183* -0.090 -0.094 -0.018 -0.029 0.037 -0.066 
Δln Share of in-commut. patients from other states 0.032 0.046 0.059 -0.013 -0.014 -0.007 0.014 -0.021 
Δln Share of out-commut. patients to other states 0.050 0.043 -0.033 0.075** 0.003 0.244*** 0.115 0.129 
Δln Out-patient physician per in-patient physician 0.021 0.133 -0.171 0.304*** -0.052 -0.218 -0.282** 0.064 
Δln Old-age dependency ratio 0.821* 0.905 0.799* 0.106 -0.158 -0.883 -0.660 -0.223 
Δln Unemployment rate -0.028 -0.043 0.013 -0.056* 0.056 0.304 -0.013 0.316* 
Δln GDP per capita -0.057 -0.066 -0.075 0.009 -0.227 -0.376 -0.414* 0.038 
Constant 0.013 0.010 -0.002 0.011 0.000 0.062 0.030 0.032 
Obs. 220 220 220 220 100 100 100 100 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.669 0.661 0.601 0.800 0.760 0.610 0.610 0.690 
Notes: The table shows the results of second-stage regressions by subsamples (11 West German states, 5 East German states) using outcome based TFP calculations as the 
dependent variable. All variables in growth rates (with exceptions of the dummy variables). Average state population 1993–2013 serves as regression weight. a) Including East 
Berlin. b) Excluding East Berlin. Significance levels (robust standard errors): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
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TABLE IV. DIFFERENT REIMBURSEMENT SCHEMES 
 Outcome (quality-adjusted discharges) 
 Reimbursement scheme 
Difference 
 Fixed daily rates (1993–2003) DRG (2004–2013) 
 
Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist 
TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Policy             
Δln Share of public hospitals 0.021 0.019 0.036* -0.017 -0.009 -0.006 -0.025 0.019 -0.030 -0.025 -0.061** 0.036 
Δln Share of private for-profit hospitals 0.004 -0.006 0.031 -0.038** 0.059* 0.057** -0.025 0.082*** 0.055 0.063** -0.057** 0.120*** 
Δln Hospital size 0.130* 0.069 0.225** -0.157*** 0.116 0.000 0.108* -0.108 -0.015 -0.068 -0.117 0.049 
Δln Specialization  0.450 0.274 0.448 -0.174 0.776** 0.289 0.792* -0.504* 0.326 0.015 0.345 -0.329 
Δln Share of hospital funding -0.013 -0.013 -0.000 -0.012 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.008 0.010 0.019 -0.002 0.020 
Δln Students of human medicine 0.047 0.103 0.147 -0.044 -0.009 -0.069 -0.000 -0.068 -0.056 -0.171 -0.147 -0.024 
Left-wing health minister  -0.008* -0.005 -0.008 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 0.005 -0.003 0.007 -0.010 
Hospital policy induced             
Δln Length of stay  -0.637** -0.967*** -0.646** -0.320*** -1.677*** -1.886*** -1.312*** -0.574* -1.040*** -0.920** -0.666 -0.254 
Δln Occupancy rate 0.474** 0.555* 0.649** -0.094 0.194 0.046 -0.001 0.046 -0.280 -0.509 -0.650** 0.141 
Δln Capital intensity 0.027 -0.203* -0.066 -0.138* 0.092 -0.120 -0.108 -0.012 0.065 0.083 -0.042 0.125 
Socio-economic conditions             
Δln Share of intensive care days -0.099 -0.069 -0.010 -0.060 -0.067 -0.108 0.008 -0.116 0.032 -0.039 0.018 -0.056 
Δln Share of in-commut. patients from other states 0.006 0.015 0.020 -0.006 0.015 0.016 0.036 -0.020 0.009 0.001 0.016 -0.015 
Δln Share of out-commut. patients to other states -0.043 0.002 0.033 -0.031 0.089* 0.098** -0.032 0.130*** 0.133 0.096 -0.065 0.160** 
Δln Out-patient physician per in-patient physician 0.006 0.135 -0.152 0.287** 0.239** 0.259** -0.030 0.290** 0.233* 0.124 0.121 0.003 
Δln Old-age dependency ratio 0.712 0.482 0.438 0.044 0.595** 0.328 0.138 0.190 -0.116 -0.154 -0.300 0.146 
Δln Unemployment rate 0.035 0.050 0.103 -0.053 -0.051 -0.040 -0.015 -0.025 -0.086 -0.090 -0.118 0.028 
Δln GDP per capita -0.221 -0.105 -0.216 0.111 -0.019 -0.153 -0.059 -0.094 0.201 -0.048 0.157 -0.205 
Obs. – – – – – – – – 320 320 320 320 
Time fixed effects – – – – – – – – Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects – – – – – – – – Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) – – – – – – – – 0.700 0.634 0.590 0.776 
Notes: The table shows the results of second-stage regressions by subperiods using outcome based TFP calculations as the dependent variable. Results come from a model using 
the interaction of policy measures and a dummy which equals one for activity-based hospital funding (2003–2013), and zero otherwise. Columns (1)–(4) show the effects for 
the period prior the introduction of activity-based hospital funding (DRG) (1993–2003), Columns (5)–(8) show the effects for the period afterwards. Columns (9) to (12) takes 
the differences between both periods. Coefficients for the constant and the interaction dummies are left out. All variables in growth rates (with exceptions of the dummy 
variables). Average state population 1993–2013 serves as regression weight. Significance levels (robust standard errors): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
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FIGURE S.1. PLAUSIBILITY CHECK FOR CAPITAL STOCK CALCULATIONS I 
 
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of our calculated hospital capital stock (national aggregation) (dotted line) 
and the capital stock of the overall health care sector (solid line) as provided by Federal Statistical Office (2015), 
Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Inlandsproduktsberechnung, Detaillierte Jahresergebnisse, 2014 (and 
previous volumes), Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.4, published 09.03.2015. Both series show the capital stock in real terms 
and are indexed to 100 in 2010. The similar evolution of both series gives support to our calculations, as the 
hospital sector accounts for a large part of the overall health care sector. 
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FIGURE S.2. PLAUSIBILITY CHECK FOR CAPITAL STOCK CALCULATIONS II 
 
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of our calculated hospital capital stock (national aggregation) as a share of 
the capital stock of the overall health care sector (solid line) as provided by Federal Statistical Office (2015), 
Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Inlandsproduktsberechnung, Detaillierte Jahresergebnisse, 2014 (and 
previous volumes), Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.4, published 09.03.2015. Furthermore, the figure gives the share of hos-
pital sector current expenditures of total in- and out-patient care sectors’ expenditures (dotted line); source: Federal 
Statistical Office (2014), Gesundheit, Ausgaben, 2012 (and previous volumes), Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.4, published 
07.04.2014). The figure depicts that the share of the hospital sector in terms of capital is only slightly above the 
share of the hospital sector in current expenditures, which gives support to our capital stock calculations. 
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TABLE S.1. RECENT STUDIES CALCULATING HOSPITAL TFP (DETERMINISTIC METHODS ONLY) 
Notes: ×: Study applies measure. a) Studies after 2008 only. For a review of prior studies, see Hollingsworth (2008). b) Full-time equivalents. c) Fixed Assets. d) Capital services. 
e) Total variable costs. f) Current assets only. g) Profits only. h) In-patient and/or out-patient 
 Country and period Level 
TFP finding 
(annualized) 
Outputh Input 
Monetary Non-monetary Labor Capital Interm. 
Production 
value/Revenue 
Dis-
charges 
Days Procedures Others 
Total  
staff 
Physicians 
Nursery 
staff 
Other staff Expenses 
Capital 
stock 
Beds Expenses Expenses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Malmquist index (DEA)a 
Afonso and Fernandes (2008) PT (2000–2005) Hospital -8.3 to 10.9%  × × ×   × × × ×  ×   
Barros et al. (2008) PT (1997–2004) Hospital 3.6%  ×  × Length of 
stay 
×b      ×  ×e 
Gannon (2008) IE (1995–1998) Hospital -0.3 to 2.8%  × ×    ×b ×b ×b   ×   
Chowdhury et al. (2010) US (2003–2006) Hospital -0.7%  × ×    ×b ×b    ×  × 
de Castro Lobo et al. (2010) BR (2003–2006) Hospital 6.9%      ×b ×     ×  ×e 
Tlotlego et al. (2010) BW (2006–2008) Hospital -1.5%  × ×   ×      ×   
Chang et al. (2011) TW (1998–2004) Hospital 2.1%  × ×  Mortality   × × ×   ×   
Huerta et al. (2011) US (2002–2006) Hospital 0.6%  × × × Case mix     ×  ×  ×e 
Ng (2011) CN (2004–2008) Hospital 7.4 to 38.7%  ×     × × ×   ×   
Nghiem et al. (2011) AU (1996–2004) Hospital 1.2 to 1.6%  ×     ×b ×b ×b   ×   
Pham (2011) VN (1998–2006) Hospital 1.4%  × × ×  ×b      ×   
Roh et al. (2011) US (1993–2003) Hospital 1.1% × ×    ×b      ×  ×e 
Sulku (2011) TR (2001–2006) Hospital 6.4%  × × × Quality × ×     ×   
Dimas et al. (2012) GR (2003–2005) Hospital -5.0 to 2.0%  × ×       ×  ×  ×e 
Karagiannis and Velentzas 
(2012) 
GR (2002–2007) Hospital -1.2 to 1.4%  ×    × ×     ×   
Thompson et al. (2012) US (2005–2008) Hospital -1.4%  × ×  Case mix     ×  ×   
De Nicola et al. (2013) IT (1999–2008) Region -8.2%  ×   Quality, 
case mix 
 × ×    ×   
Huerta et al. (2013) US (2005–2008) Hospital 0.8%  × × ×  ×b  ×b    ×   
Roh et al. (2013) US (2002–2006) Hospital -0.9% ×g × × × Charity 
care 
×b     ×f ×   
Bwana (2014) TZ (2001–2012) Hospital -1.6%  × × ×  ×b      ×   
Li et al. (2014) CN (2006–2009) Hospital 26.7%  × ×   ×      ×   
Torabipour et al. (2014) IR (2007–2010) Hospital 2.4%  ×  × Length of 
stay 
 × ×    ×   
Castelli et al. (2015) UK (2008–2010) Hospital 0.4%  ×  × Survival r., 
life expect. 
×       × ×e 
Törnqvist index 
Cromwell and Pope (1989) US (1981–1986) National -4.1 to -0.2% × × ×    × × ×  ×c    
Cylus and Dickensheets 
(2008) 
US (1981–2005) National 0.0 to 0.4% ×     ×    × ×c  × × 
Harper et al. (2010) US (1987–2006) National -0.9% ×     ×b       ×d × 
Gu and Morin (2014) CA (2002–2008) National 0.3%     Output in-
dex 
×b     ×   × 
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TABLE S.2. DESCRIPTIVES 
 
 Obs. Mean Min. Max. Std. Der. 
Average 
growth rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Output Number of discharges 336 1,045,733 164,499 4,407,169 980,955 1.08% 
 Quality index 336 120 95 172 13 1.35% 
 Outcome (quality-adjusted discharges) 336 1,241,888 173,603 5,996,737 1,168,073 2.44% 
Inputs Physicians (full-time equivalents) 336 7,373 1,205 33,809 6,854 2.08% 
Nursing staff (full-time equivalents) 336 20,120 3,465 82,726 18,497 -0.24% 
 Other staff (full-time equivalents) 336 24,663 3,334 96,986 22,614 -0.98% 
 Capital stock (in 1.000 Euroa) 336 8,300,107 588,935 33,100,000 7,441,295 4.13% 
 Energy (in 1.000 Euroa) 336 66,843 8,773 315,155 64,483 1.26% 
 Materials (in 1.000 Euroa) 336 993,301 137,100 4,780,383 961,358 3.05% 
 Services (in 1.000 Euroa) 336 60,069 6,511 388,777 68,711 3.99% 
Törnqvist 
cost shares 
Labor 320 0.65 0.52 0.74 0.04 – 
 Physicians (share of total labor) 320 0.25 0.19 0.34 0.04 – 
 Nursing staff (share of total labor) 320 0.35 0.28 0.42 0.03 – 
 Other staff (share of total labor) 320 0.40 0.32 0.48 0.02 – 
Capital 320 0.10 0.03 0.18 0.03 – 
Intermediate goods 320 0.26 0.22 0.37 0.03 – 
  Energy (share of total intermediates) 320 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.01 – 
  Materials (share of total intermediates) 320 0.88 0.79 0.91 0.02 – 
  Services (share of total intermediates) 320 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.02 – 
Inputs for 
sensitivity 
analysis 
Total staff (full-time equivalents) 336 52,156 8,315 202,004 47,713 -0.27% 
Beds 336 34,092 5,111 153,897 32,657 -1.23% 
Total intermediate goods (in 1.000 Euroa) 336 1,130,108 135,553 5,458,887 1,078,933 3.05% 
Second-stage 
regression 
variables 
Policy       
Share of public hospitals 336 0.35 0.02 0.78 0.15 -2.88% 
Share of private for-profit hospitals 336 0.26 0 0.71 0.15 4.43% 
Hospital size 336 280 151 482 67 -0.42% 
Specialization 336 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.02 -0.20% 
Share of hospital funding 336 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 -1.74% 
 Students of human medicine 336 5,156 0 21,336 4,707 -0.10% 
 Left-wing health minister 336 0.58 0.00 1.00 0.49 – 
 Hospital management       
 Length of stay 336 9.50 7.11 19.63 1.88 -2.79% 
 Occupancy rate 336 0.80 0.72 0.88 0.03 -0.22% 
 Capital intensity (capital stock/total staff) 336 162.86 30.33 324.64 58.91 4.39% 
 Socio-economic conditions       
 Share of intensive care days 336 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.01 3.29% 
 Share of in-com. patients from other states 336 0.10 0.03 0.37 0.08 0.65% 
 Share of out-com. patients to other states 336 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.04 0.79% 
 Out-patient physician per in-patient phys. 336 0.88 0.67 1.09 0.09 -0.66% 
 Old-age dependency ratio 336 0.30 0.19 0.41 0.05 1.91% 
 Unemployment rate 336 0.12 0.04 0.22 0.05 -1.11% 
 GDP per capita (in 1.000 Euroa) 336 28.78 13.72 55.11 8.53 1.46% 
Notes: The table depicts the descriptives of our overall dataset (16 states, 21 years). a) 2013 constant prices. 
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TABLE S.3. DATA COMPUTATION AND SOURCES 
Variable Computation Sources 
Output The outcome 𝑦𝑡 in period 𝑡 has been calculated as the number of in-pa-
tient discharges (Entlassungen aus vollstationärer Behandlung) which is 
the output volume 𝑑𝑡, weighted by a quality index 𝑞𝑡. Hence, 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑞𝑡𝑑𝑡. 
The quality index 𝑞𝑡 is given by the product of a hospital mortality index 
and an inverse overall population mortality index:  
𝑞𝑡 = [(
𝑑𝑚,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
) (
𝑑𝑚,1
𝑑1
)
−1
] [(
𝑝𝑚,𝑡
𝑝𝑡
)
−1
(
𝑝𝑚,1
𝑝1
)]  
where 𝑑𝑡 gives the number of discharges in 𝑡, and 𝑑1 is the number of dis-
charges in the initial period. 𝑑𝑚 defines the number of mortality cases. 
Similarly, 𝑝𝑡 gives the overall population in a state, 𝑝𝑚,𝑡 the number of 
deaths in this state in 𝑡. 
Federal Statistical Office (2014a), Gesundheit. 
Grunddaten der Krankenhäuser, 2013 (and pre-
vious volumes). Fachserie 12, Reihe 6.1.1, pub-
lished on 26.09.2014, Wiesbaden. 
Labor Labor volume is represented by full-time equivalents of physicians, 
nurses and other staff (Personal (umgerechnet in Vollkräfte): 
Hauptamtliche Ärzte und Ärztinnen, Pflegedienst, Sonstiges Personal) 
Federal Statistical Office (2014a), Gesundheit. 
Grunddaten der Krankenhäuser, 2013 (and pre-
vious volumes). Fachserie 12, Reihe 6.1.1, pub-
lished on 26.09.2014, Wiesbaden. 
Capital  For measuring capital, we use a simplified version of the Perpetual Inven-
tory Method. Basically, we calculate the capital stock 𝐾𝑡 as the sum of the 
survived investments of all prior periods 𝜏 < 𝑡. Thus, 𝐾𝑡 is given by 𝐾𝑡 =
∑ 𝐼𝜏 ∙ (1 − 𝐹(𝜏))
𝑡−1
𝜏=1 .  
Based on a study of German hospitals, we assume an average service life 
of 20 years of the overall “hospital capital good mix”. This assumption re-
lies on a study on German hospitals that reveals a linear depreciation rate 
of approximately 5% (Berliner Krankenhausgesellschaft and Senatsver-
waltung für Gesundheit, Umwelt und Verbraucherschutz, 2011). We de-
fine: 
𝐹(𝜏) = {
∫ 𝑓(𝜏)
0 𝑖𝑓 ∫ 𝑓(𝜏) < 0.01  
with: 
𝑓(𝑡) = 99(8!)−120−9𝑡8𝑒(−
9𝑡
20
). 
The second term 𝑓(𝑡) gives the mortality function of capital goods of an 
average life of 20 years (Schmalwasser and Schidlowski, 2006). The inte-
gral of the mortality function yields the share of retired goods of a cohort. 
We define a break condition if the share of survived goods falls below 
1%. 
We compute long-term investment series (1950–2013) for all states. Total 
investment consists of the following four sources: regular public invest-
ment (KHG-Mittel), investment of university hospitals (Investitionen der 
Hochschulkliniken), other public investments (Sonstiges) and own funds 
(Eigenmittel). For all states, we observe KHG-Mittel and Investitionen der 
Hochschulkliniken after 1991 (Deutsche Krankenhausgesellschaft 2014, 
Federal Statistical Office 2014b). For investments before 1991, we have 
to make several assumptions, especially concerning state-level invest-
ments before 1972 for West Germany and before 1991 for the six less-
documented states of the former GDR. Our estimates are based on official 
governmental documents (BT-Drs. V/4230) and historical documentation 
(Arnold und Schirmer, 1990; Institut für angewandte Wirtschaftsfor-
schung, 1990; Schwarzer, 1999; Bruckenberger, 2002; Bruckenberger, 
2006). From these sources, we calculate a public financed capital stock. In 
addition, we assume own funded investments to be zero up to 1991 fol-
lowing Augursky (2013). Afterwards, we assume a rising level of own-
funded capital stock leading to the level of the own-funded capital stock 
measured by Augursky (2013). 
Berliner Krankenhausgesellschaft and Senats-
verwaltung für Gesundheit, Umwelt und Ver-
braucherschutz (2011), Investitionsbedarf der 
Krankenhäuser in Berlin, Berlin. Schmalwasser 
O. and M. Schidlowski (2006), Measuring Capi-
tal Stock in Germany. Slightly abridged [Eng-
lish] version of a paper published in Wirtschaft 
und Statistik 11: 1–15. Deutsche Krankenhaus-
gesellschaft (2014): Bestandsaufnahme zur 
Krankenhausplanung und Investitionsfinanzie-
rung in den Bundesländern, Stand: Januar 2013, 
Berlin. Federal Statistical Office (2014b), Bil-
dung und Kultur. Finanzen der Hochschulen, 
2012 (and previous volumes, provided on requ-
est). Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.5, published on 
12.06.2014, Wiesbaden. BT-Drs. V/4230. 
Arnold, M. and B. Schirmer (1990), Gesundheit 
für ein Deutschland, Deutscher Ärzte-Verlag, 
Köln. Institut für angewandte Wirtschaftsfor-
schung (1990), Wirtschaftsreport: Daten und 
Zahlen zur wirtschaftlichen Lage Ostdeutsch-
lands, Verlag Die Wirtschaft Berlin, Berlin. 
Schwarzer, O. (1999), Sozialistische Zentral-
planwirtschaft in der SBZ/DDR. Ergebnisse ei-
nes ordnungspolitischen Experiments (1945-
1989). Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirt-
schaftsgeschichte Beiheft 143. Bruckenberger, 
E. (2002), Investitionsoffensive für Kranken-
häuser?, Hannover. Bruckenberger, E. (2006), 
Angebots-, Nachfrage- und Finanzierungsstruk-
turen. In: Bruckenberger, E., Klaue, S. and H.-P. 
Schwintowski (Eds.), Krankenhausmärkte zwi-
schen Regulierung und Wettbewerb, Springer, 
Berlin, Heidelberg: 29–84. Augursky, B. 
(2013), Krankenhaus Rating Report 2013: Kön-
nen wir uns die aktuelle Krankenhauslandschaft 
noch leisten? Presentation at the Interaktiver 
Workshop der Finanzierungskommission der 
DGGG, 06.12.2013. 
Intermediate 
goods 
Intermediate goods volumes are separately calculated for energy, material 
and services. The volume for energy is given by the costs for water, en-
ergy and supply (Wasser, Energie, Brennstoffe) deflated by the consumer 
price index for housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels. If availa-
ble, a state-level consumer price index has been applied. Otherwise, the 
federal index has been used. The volume for services is calculated as the 
sum of the costs for central management services and service centers, 
taxes, duties, insurance (Zentrale Verwaltungsdienste, Zentrale Gemein-
schaftsdienste, Steuern, Abgaben, Versicherungen), deflated with a GDP-
Federal Statistical Office (2014c): Gesundheit. 
Kostennachweis der Krankenhäuser, 2013 (and 
previous volumes), Fachserie 12, Reihe 6.3, 
published on 11.11.2014, Wiesbaden. 
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based state-level price index for services. The volume for material con-
sists of the residual costs not covered by energy or services, deflated by 
the state-level GDP price index. 
Due to a conceptual change from gross to net costs in 1996 and the re-
verse in 2002, in these years, changes in costs are given by the change in 
overall adjusted costs (Bereinigte Kosten). 
Törnqvist cost 
shares 
The labor cost shares of the Törnqvist index is calculated as the share of 
total wages, deflated by the GDP price index, of overall costs. Capital 
costs are given by depreciation (proxied by 5% of the annual capital stock 
in real terms, see above) plus interest rate payments (Zinsaufwendungen), 
deflated by the GDP price index. Division by overall costs gives the capi-
tal cost share. Cost share of intermediate goods are given as the sum of in-
termediate goods by overall costs. Overall costs consist of the sum of la-
bor, capital and intermediate goods costs. Note that the shares enter the 
Törnqvist index as two-year means. 
The shares for the Törnqvist sub-indices for labor (weights: share of 
wages of each labor type) and intermediates (weights: cost shares) are de-
rived likewise. 
Due to a conceptual change from gross to net costs in 1996 and the re-
verse in 2002, in these years, changes in costs are given by the change in 
overall adjusted costs (Bereinigte Kosten). 
Federal Statistical Office (2014c): Gesundheit. 
Kostennachweis der Krankenhäuser, 2013 (and 
previous volumes), Fachserie 12, Reihe 6.3, 
published on 11.11.2014, Wiesbaden. 
Notes: The table shows our strategy to conduct data on inputs and outputs. Further information is available upon 
request. 
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TABLE S.4. PRODUCTIVITY RESULTS – II, 1993–2013 
 Törnqvist Malmquist 
 Input growth contributionsa 
TFP TFP 
Thereof: 
 
Labor Capital 
Intermediate 
goods 
EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Baseline (Labor: 3 types of staff, Capital: Capital stocks, Intermediates: 3 types of intermediates) 
All states        
Number of discharges 0.01% 0.34% 0.78% -0.05% -0.37% 0.30% -0.67% 
Quality index 0.01% 0.34% 0.78% 1.35% 0.85% -0.14% 0.99% 
Outcome 0.01% 0.34% 0.78% 1.30% 0.48% 0.16% 0.32% 
West Germanyb        
Number of discharges 0.00% 0.14% 0.75% 0.12% 0.28% 0.40% -0.12% 
Quality index 0.00% 0.14% 0.75% 0.99% 0.81% -0.26% 1.07% 
Outcome 0.00% 0.14% 0.75% 1.11% 1.09% 0.14% 0.95% 
East Germanyc        
Output 0.03% 0.79% 0.85% -0.42% -1.80% 0.09% -1.89% 
Quality 0.03% 0.79% 0.85% 2.14% 0.94% 0.13% 0.82% 
Outcome 0.03% 0.79% 0.85% 1.72% -0.86% 0.22% -1.07% 
Panel B: Sensitivity test (Labor: total staff, Capital: beds, Intermediates: total intermediates) 
All states        
Number of discharges -0.18% -0.12% 0.80% 0.59% 1.01% 0.32% 0.69% 
Quality index -0.18% -0.12% 0.80% 1.35% 1.34% -0.26% 1.60% 
Outcome -0.18% -0.12% 0.80% 1.94% 2.35% 0.06% 2.29% 
West Germanyb        
Number of discharges -0.17% -0.13% 0.74% 0.57% 1.06% 0.36% 0.69% 
Quality index -0.17% -0.13% 0.74% 0.99% 1.00% -0.55% 1.55% 
Outcome -0.17% -0.13% 0.74% 1.57% 2.06% -0.19% 2.25% 
East Germanyc        
Number of discharges -0.20% -0.10% 0.92% 0.63% 0.92% 0.22% 0.70% 
Quality index -0.20% -0.10% 0.92% 2.14% 2.07% 0.38% 1.69% 
Outcome -0.20% -0.10% 0.92% 2.77% 2.99% 0.60% 2.39% 
Notes: The table depicts the results of our TFP calculations. a) The sum of the growth contributions of all inputs 
and TFP is identical to the output growth rate. b) Including East Berlin. c) Excluding East Berlin. 
 
TABLE S.5. CONTROL FOR CASE MIX INDEX, 2005–2013 
 Outcome (quality-adjusted discharges) 
 Baseline (2005–2013) Control for Case Mix Index (2005–2013) 
 
Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist 
TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Policy         
Δln Share of public hospitals -0.015** -0.006 -0.022 0.016 -0.009 -0.002 -0.020 0.018 
Δln Share of private for-profit hospitals 0.012 0.029 -0.034 0.063** 0.015 0.026 -0.034 0.059** 
Δln Hospital size 0.142 -0.008 0.187 -0.195** 0.149 0.004 0.191* -0.186* 
Δln Specialization  0.627** 0.406 0.559 -0.153 0.672*** 0.341 0.558* -0.218* 
Δln Share of hospital funding 0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.007 0.000 -0.004 0.004 -0.008 
Δln Students of human medicine -0.033 -0.109 -0.024 -0.085 -0.035 -0.114 -0.026 -0.088 
Left-wing health minister  -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 
Hospital policy induced         
Δln Length of stay  -1.948*** -2.103*** -1.779*** -0.324 -1.921*** -2.108*** -1.773*** -0.335 
Δln Occupancy rate 0.061 0.060 0.157 -0.098 0.063 0.069 0.159 -0.090 
Δln Capital intensity 0.109 -0.110 0.007 -0.116 0.126 -0.109 0.011 -0.120 
Socio-economic conditions         
Δln Share of intensive care days 0.007 -0.059 -0.009 -0.050     
Δln Case Mix Index     -0.075 -0.043 -0.026 -0.016 
Δln Share of in-commut. patients from other states 0.036 0.039 0.078 -0.039 0.036 0.028 0.076 -0.048 
Δln Share of out-commut. patients to other states 0.046 -0.002 -0.079 0.077 0.050 0.004 -0.077 0.081 
Δln Out-patient physician per in-patient physician 0.058 0.003 -0.135 0.138 0.044 -0.005 -0.140 0.135 
Δln Old-age dependency ratio 0.094 -0.187 -0.022 -0.165 0.112 -0.183 -0.017 -0.166 
Δln Unemployment rate 0.004 -0.005 -0.030 0.025 -0.004 -0.000 -0.031 0.031 
Δln GDP per capita 0.109 -0.050 0.030 -0.080 0.094 -0.040 0.028 -0.068 
Constant -0.027*** -0.020* -0.037*** 0.017** -0.026*** -0.021** -0.037*** 0.016** 
Obs. 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.757 0.640 0.560 0.659 0.759 0.638 0.561 0.656 
Notes: The table shows the results of second-stage regressions using outcome based TFP calculations of the period 2005–2013 as the dependent variable. All variables in growth 
rates (with exceptions of the dummy variables). Average state population 1993–2013 serves as regression weight. Significance levels (robust standard errors): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, 
* 0.10. 
 
TABLE S.6. LENGTH OF STAY AS ADDITIONAL OUTPUT, 1993–2013 
 Extended outcome (quality-adjusted discharges, length of stay) 
 Baseline Length of stay as additional output 
 
Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist 
TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Policy         
Δln Share of public hospitals 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001 – 0.009 0.011 -0.002 
Δln Share of private for-profit hospitals 0.008 -0.003 0.008 -0.011 – 0.001 0.015 -0.013 
Δln Hospital size 0.144** 0.063 0.178*** -0.115** – 0.065 0.127*** -0.062 
Δln Specialization  0.452** 0.062 0.489** -0.427** – 0.415 0.759** -0.344* 
Δln Share of hospital funding -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 – -0.004 0.004 -0.008 
Δln Students of human medicine 0.033 0.019 0.052 -0.033 – 0.064 0.071 -0.006 
Left-wing health minister  -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 – -0.013** -0.008 -0.005 
Hospital policy induced         
Δln Length of stay  -0.888*** -1.179*** -0.777*** -0.402** – – – – 
Δln Occupancy rate 0.336** 0.311* 0.317** -0.006 – 0.005 0.056 -0.050 
Δln Capital intensity -0.017 -0.187** -0.070 -0.117* – -0.065 0.026 -0.091 
Socio-economic conditions         
Δln Share of intensive care days -0.119* -0.107 -0.022 -0.084* – -0.051 0.032 -0.083* 
Δln Share of in-commut. patients from other states -0.002 0.007 0.031 -0.023 – 0.012 0.032 -0.020 
Δln Share of out-commut. patients to other states 0.020 0.050 -0.014 0.064** – 0.082* 0.004 0.078** 
Δln Out-patient physician per in-patient physician 0.112 0.188** -0.069 0.257** – 0.145** -0.077 0.222** 
Δln Old-age dependency ratio 0.629* 0.445 0.298 0.147 – 0.246 0.189 0.057 
Δln Unemployment rate -0.019 -0.013 0.034 -0.046 – -0.031 0.007 -0.039 
Δln GDP per capita -0.112 -0.121 -0.092 -0.029 – -0.320* -0.188 -0.132 
Constant 0.020 -0.003 -0.024 0.021 – 0.052** 0.009 0.042** 
Obs. 320 320 320 320 – 320 320 320 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes – Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes – Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.637 0.580 0.534 0.749 – 0.452 0.452 0.693 
Notes: The table shows the results of second-stage regressions using outcome based TFP calculations as the dependent variable. Columns (1) to (4) reproduce our baseline 
findings. In columns (5) to (8), we treat the length of stay as an additional output and not as a second-stage explanatory variable. All variables in growth rates (with exceptions 
of the dummy variables). Average state population 1993–2013 serves as regression weight. Significance levels (robust standard errors): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10.  
  
 
TABLE S.7. WEST GERMANY AND EAST GERMANY – II, 1993–2013 
 Number of discharges 
 West Germanya East Germanyb 
 
Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist 
TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Policy         
Δln Share of public hospitals 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.001 -0.030 -0.076 -0.055 -0.021 
Δln Share of private for-profit hospitals 0.014 0.009 -0.000 0.010 -0.002 -0.041 -0.015 -0.026 
Δln Hospital size 0.093** 0.016 0.071* -0.054* 0.169* -0.036 0.109 -0.145 
Δln Specialization  0.345** 0.307 0.370*** -0.063 0.128 -0.370 -0.029 -0.340 
Δln Share of hospital funding 0.011 0.014 0.022** -0.008 -0.000 -0.004 0.009 -0.013 
Δln Students of human medicine 0.026 0.107* 0.074 0.033 0.188 -0.076 0.071 -0.147 
Left-wing health minister  -0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.000 
Hospital policy induced         
Δln Length of stay  -0.284*** -0.522*** -0.467*** -0.055 -0.761** -0.709 -0.611** -0.098 
Δln Occupancy rate 0.206*** 0.221* 0.272*** -0.051 0.331* 0.526* 0.206 0.320 
Δln Capital intensity 0.206*** 0.322*** 0.192** 0.129 0.144* 0.168 0.078 0.090 
Socio-economic conditions         
Δln Share of intensive care days -0.090* -0.062 -0.013 -0.049 -0.010 -0.047 -0.005 -0.042 
Δln Share of in-commut. patients from other states 0.012 0.019 0.027 -0.008 0.012 0.041 0.006 0.035 
Δln Share of out-commut. patients to other states 0.010 -0.004 -0.016 0.012 -0.058 0.061 -0.003 0.065 
Δln Out-patient physician per in-patient physician -0.013 0.034 -0.047 0.081 -0.064 -0.121 -0.141 0.020 
Δln Old-age dependency ratio 0.457 0.503 0.584 -0.082 0.081 -0.870 0.026 -0.896 
Δln Unemployment rate -0.031 -0.067*** -0.049* -0.018 0.018 0.339** 0.113 0.226** 
Δln GDP per capita -0.114 -0.156 -0.092 -0.064 -0.141 -0.021 0.089 -0.109 
Constant -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.062** -0.031 -0.045 0.014 
Obs. 220 220 220 220 100 100 100 100 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.670 0.609 0.424 0.672 0.722 0.504 0.410 0.596 
Notes: The table shows the results of second-stage regressions by subsamples (11 West German states, 5 East German states) using discharges based TFP calculations as the 
dependent variable. All variables in growth rates (with exceptions of the dummy variables). Average state population 1993–2013 serves as regression weight. a) Including East 
Berlin. b) Excluding East Berlin. Significance levels (robust standard errors): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
  
 
TABLE S.8. WEST GERMANY AND EAST GERMANY – III, 1993–2013 
 Quality index 
 West Germanya East Germanyb 
 
Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist 
TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Policy         
Δln Share of public hospitals 0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.005 0.063 0.087** 0.054 0.034 
Δln Share of private for-profit hospitals 0.011 0.001 0.011 -0.011 0.019 0.036** 0.025 0.010 
Δln Hospital size 0.106* 0.101 0.134** -0.033 -0.118 -0.180** -0.129 -0.051 
Δln Specialization  0.437*** 0.227 0.600** -0.373 -0.125 -0.612* -0.041 -0.571 
Δln Share of hospital funding -0.009 -0.001 -0.015 0.014* -0.019** -0.025 -0.021 -0.004 
Δln Students of human medicine 0.024 -0.025 0.054 -0.079 0.039 0.204 0.066 0.137 
Left-wing health minister  -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
Hospital policy induced         
Δln Length of stay  -0.436** -0.532** -0.259 -0.272* -0.593* -0.505 -0.192 -0.313 
Δln Occupancy rate 0.133 0.130 0.093 0.037 0.218 0.148 0.124 0.025 
Δln Capital intensity 0.057 -0.135 -0.035 -0.099 -0.162 -0.414** -0.319* -0.095 
Socio-economic conditions         
Δln Share of intensive care days -0.111* -0.121 -0.077 -0.044 -0.008 0.018 0.042 -0.024 
Δln Share of in-commut. patients from other states 0.020 0.027 0.032 -0.004 -0.026** -0.048** 0.008 -0.056 
Δln Share of out-commut. patients to other states 0.040 0.047 -0.017 0.063* 0.061 0.182** 0.118 0.064 
Δln Out-patient physician per in-patient physician 0.034 0.099 -0.124 0.222** 0.012 -0.097 -0.141 0.044 
Δln Old-age dependency ratio 0.364** 0.402* 0.215 0.187 -0.239 -0.012 -0.685 0.673 
Δln Unemployment rate 0.003 0.024 0.062 -0.038 0.038 -0.035 -0.126 0.091 
Δln GDP per capita 0.057 0.090 0.017 0.073 -0.086 -0.355** -0.502 0.147 
Constant 0.017** 0.013* -0.000 0.013** 0.063* 0.093* 0.076 0.017 
Obs. 220 220 220 220 100 100 100 100 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.627 0.575 0.534 0.773 0.704 0.676 0.532 0.757 
Notes: The table shows the results of second-stage regressions by subsamples (11 West German states, 5 East German states) using quality index based TFP calculations as the 
dependent variable. All variables in growth rates (with exceptions of the dummy variables). Average state population 1993–2013 serves as regression weight. a) Including East 
Berlin. b) Excluding East Berlin. Significance levels (robust standard errors): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10.
 
TABLE S.9. DIFFERENT REIMBURSEMENT SCHEMES – II 
 Number of discharges 
 Reimbursement scheme 
Difference 
 Fixed daily rates (1993–2003) DRG (2004–2013) 
 
Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist 
TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Policy             
Δln Share of public hospitals 0.091*** 0.017 0.090** -0.073** 0.037 -0.070 -0.020 -0.050   -0.054 -0.087 -0.110* 0.023 
Δln Share of private for-profit hospitals 0.003 0.005 0.011 -0.007 -0.007 0.000 -0.008 0.008   -0.011 -0.004 -0.019 0.015 
Δln Hospital size 0.003 -0.010 -0.001 -0.009 0.029 0.047** -0.006 0.053*  0.026 0.057* -0.005 0.062** 
Δln Specialization  0.472** 0.596** 0.500** 0.096 0.163 -0.111 0.279** -0.390**  -0.309 -0.707*** -0.221 -0.486** 
Δln Share of hospital funding 0.002 0.003 0.019*** -0.016** 0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.003   0.001 -0.000 -0.013 0.013 
Δln Students of human medicine 0.032 0.076 0.061 0.015 -0.027 -0.068 -0.007 -0.060   -0.059 -0.144 -0.068 -0.075 
Left-wing health minister  0.001 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.002 -0.000 0.004 -0.004   0.001 -0.009** -0.001 -0.008** 
Hospital policy induced             
Δln Length of stay  -0.248** -0.518*** -0.480*** -0.038 -0.846*** -0.906*** -0.898*** -0.008   -0.598*** -0.388 -0.418 0.030 
Δln Occupancy rate 0.200*** 0.245 0.276 -0.031 0.188* 0.079 0.101 -0.022   -0.013 -0.166 -0.175 0.009 
Δln Capital intensity 0.053 0.008 -0.013 0.021 0.067 0.090 0.066 0.024   0.014 0.082 0.078 0.003 
Socio-economic conditions             
Δln Share of intensive care days -0.059 -0.037 -0.019 -0.018 0.009 -0.000 0.079** -0.080   0.068 0.037 0.099** -0.062 
Δln Share of in-commut. patients from other states 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.010 0.008 0.034 -0.026   -0.017 0.003 0.033 -0.030 
Δln Share of out-commut. patients to other states -0.057* -0.038 -0.053* 0.015 0.040** 0.055 0.045 0.010   0.096** 0.093 0.098 -0.005 
Δln Out-patient physician per in-patient physician 0.006 0.091 0.032 0.059 0.108** 0.153* -0.064 0.217**  0.102 0.062 -0.096 0.158 
Δln Old-age dependency ratio 0.292 0.089 0.466 -0.376 0.509** 0.161 0.289 -0.128   0.217 0.072 -0.176 0.248 
Δln Unemployment rate -0.000 0.022 0.018 0.004 -0.035 -0.023 -0.007 -0.016   -0.035 -0.045 -0.025 -0.020 
Δln GDP per capita -0.246* -0.193 -0.030 -0.164 -0.094* -0.250** -0.144 -0.107   0.153 -0.057 -0.114 0.057 
Obs. – – – – – – – – 320 320 320 320 
Time fixed effects – – – – – – – – Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects – – – – – – – – Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) – – – – – – – – 0.668 0.531 0.411 0.614 
Notes: The table shows the results of second-stage regressions by subperiods using discharges based TFP calculations as the dependent variable. Results come from a model 
using the interaction of policy measures and a dummy which equals one for activity-based hospital funding (2003–2013), and zero otherwise. Columns (1)–(4) show the effects 
for the period prior the introduction of activity-based hospital funding (DRG) (1993–2003), Columns (5)–(8) show the effects for the period afterwards. Columns (9) to (12) 
takes the differences between both periods. Coefficients for the constant and the interaction dummies are left out. All variables in growth rates (with exceptions of the dummy 
variables). Average state population 1993–2013 serves as regression weight. Significance levels (robust standard errors): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
 
TABLE S.10. DIFFERENT REIMBURSEMENT SCHEMES – III 
 Quality index 
 Reimbursement scheme 
Difference 
 Fixed daily rates (1993–2003) DRG (2004–2013) 
 
Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist Törnqvist Malmquist 
TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH TFP TFP EFFCH TECHCH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Policy             
Δln Share of public hospitals 0.039 0.052 0.136** -0.084* 0.079 0.070 0.128** -0.058 0.040 0.019 -0.007 0.026 
Δln Share of private for-profit hospitals 0.017 0.014 0.025 -0.011 -0.001 -0.007 -0.017 0.010 -0.019 -0.021 -0.042 0.021 
Δln Hospital size 0.002 0.003 0.032* -0.029** 0.030** 0.010 -0.019 0.029 0.029** 0.007 -0.051 0.058* 
Δln Specialization  -0.022 -0.322 -0.052 -0.270 0.613** 0.400 0.513 -0.113 0.635 0.722 0.565 0.157 
Δln Share of hospital funding -0.014 -0.016 -0.019 0.004 -0.004 0.003 -0.008 0.011 0.010 0.019 0.012 0.007 
Δln Students of human medicine 0.015 0.027 0.086 -0.059 0.018 -0.001 0.007 -0.008 0.003 -0.028 -0.079 0.051 
Left-wing health minister  -0.009*** -0.013** -0.013** -0.000 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008* -0.002 
Hospital policy induced             
Δln Length of stay  -0.389** -0.449** -0.166 -0.283*** -0.831*** -0.981*** -0.414 -0.567** -0.441** -0.532** -0.248 -0.284 
Δln Occupancy rate 0.274 0.309 0.373** -0.063 0.006 -0.034 -0.102 0.068 -0.268 -0.343 -0.475 0.132 
Δln Capital intensity -0.026 -0.212*** -0.053 -0.159*** 0.025 -0.210** -0.173 -0.037 0.051 0.002 -0.120 0.122 
Socio-economic conditions             
Δln Share of intensive care days -0.040 -0.032 0.010 -0.042 -0.075 -0.108** -0.071** -0.037 -0.035 -0.076 -0.081 0.005 
Δln Share of in-commut. patients from other states -0.002 0.011 0.020 -0.009 0.025 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.027 -0.002 -0.017 0.015 
Δln Share of out-commut. patients to other states 0.013 0.041 0.086*** -0.045 0.050 0.043 -0.077** 0.120*** 0.036 0.002 -0.163*** 0.165*** 
Δln Out-patient physician per in-patient physician 0.001 0.044 -0.183 0.227* 0.131** 0.106 0.034 0.073 0.131 0.062 0.217 -0.155 
Δln Old-age dependency ratio 0.419 0.393 -0.028 0.421 0.086 0.167 -0.151 0.319 -0.333 -0.226 -0.124 -0.102 
Δln Unemployment rate 0.035 0.028 0.085 -0.057 -0.016 -0.016 -0.007 -0.009 -0.051 -0.045 -0.092 0.048 
Δln GDP per capita 0.025 0.089 -0.186 0.275** 0.074 0.098 0.085 0.013 0.049 0.009 0.271 -0.262 
Obs. – – – – – – – – 320 320 320 320 
Time fixed effects – – – – – – – – Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects – – – – – – – – Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) – – – – – – – – 0.640 0.566 0.514 0.762 
Notes: The table shows the results of second-stage regressions by subperiods using quality index based TFP calculations as the dependent variable. Results come from a model 
using the interaction of policy measures and a dummy which equals one for activity-based hospital funding (2003–2013), and zero otherwise. Columns (1)–(4) show the effects 
for the period prior the introduction of activity-based hospital funding (DRG) (1993–2003), Columns (5)–(8) show the effects for the period afterwards. Columns (9) to (12) 
takes the differences between both periods. Coefficients for the constant and the interaction dummies are left out. All variables in growth rates (with exceptions of the dummy 
variables). Average state population 1993–2013 serves as regression weight. Significance levels (robust standard errors): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
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